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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. See also Utah Code Ann, 78-2a-3(2)(e), conferring 
jurisdiction on this Court. 
The Judgment and Order of Probation were signed by the Honorable Lyle 
Anderson on January 7th, 2003 and entered by the Clerk of the Court on January 
7 , 2003. Sentencing was on January 6 , 2003. The Notice of Appeal was filed 
on January 22nd, 2003, within 30 days of the entry of judgment. The Appeal is 
therefore timely pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
I. Was the search of Defendant's vehicle legal? 
II. Should statements made by the Defendant to Law Enforcement 
officers be suppressed as violative of his Miranda right? 
Standard of Review: the Court reviews the factual findings underlying the 
trial courts decision to grant or deny a Motion to Suppress under a clearly 
erroneous standard. State v. Troyer, 910 P. 2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1995). 
The legal determination regarding reasonable suspicion made by the trial 
courts are reviewed for correctness according no deference to the trial 
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court's conclusion. State v. Yates, 918 P. 2d 136, 138 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Patefield, 927, P. 2d 655 (Utah App. 1996). 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 14, of the Constitution of Utah provides, in relevant part, 
that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing be seized. 
Amendment Four of the Constitution of the United States provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things be seized. 
Amendment Five of the Constitution of the United States provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without 
due process of law. 
Amendment Six of the Constitution of the United States provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defense. 
Amendment Fourteen of the Constitution of the United States provides, in 
relevant part, that: 
No State shall...deprive any person of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of law. 
Utah Code Section 76-l-501(l)(2)(a)(b) provides, in relevant part, that: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent 
until each element of the offense charged against him is proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, the 
defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Bartlett appeals his conviction following a jury trial of Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance, in violation of Section 58-37-8-(2)(a)(i) U.C.A., a 
Third Degree Felony; Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operator's License, in 
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violation of Section 55-3-227 (i) a Class C Misdemeanor; and No Registration, in 
violation of Section 41-la-1303(l) a Class C Misdemeanor. 
Defendant does not allege any irregularities at his trial but appeals the 
denial of his Motion to Suppress. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
Mr. Bartlett was charged in a three count Information filed on October 31st, 
2002. After a Preliminary Hearing on Defendant was bound over on all charges. 
Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress on December 4th, 2002. The 
Suppression Hearing was held on December 16th before the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson, Judge. The Motion was denied. 
After a Jury Trial on December 22nd, 2002, Defendant was found guilty of 
all charges. Defendant was sentenced on January 6th, 2003. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW, 
At sentencing Judge Anderson ordered the Defendant to serve a term in the 
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years on Count I, and ninety days in the San 
Juan County Jail on Counts 2 and 3. All time to be served concurrently. No fines 
or restitution were ordered. 
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D, STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
On October 25, 2002 the Defendant James Bartlett was approaching the 
City of Monticello Utah from the east (Suppression Hearing ["S.H."]-7) Kent 
Rowley, a Monticello City Police Officer received a call from Dispatch advising a 
green Cadillac was driving fast and recklessly (S.H.-7). He proceeded to the Port 
of Entry to set up for radar (S.H.-8). He locked in Mr. Bartlett's vehicle going 72 
miles an hour (S.H.-9). The vehicle was a Buick, not a Cadillac (S.H.-9). Officer 
Rowley made traffic stop (S.H.-9). 
The officer approached the vehicle and asked the driver, Mr. Bartlett for his 
driver's license (S.H.-9, 10). There were five other people in the car. Mr. 
Bartlett's mother was in the front passenger seat, and a Mr. Snow and three 
children in the back seat (S.H.-10; 13). Mr. Bartlett did not produce a driver's 
license giving Officer Rowley an I.D. card (S.H.-10), and an expired registration 
for the vehicle (S.H.-l 1). Mr. Bartlett also produced a title for the vehicle that had 
been signed over to him. The original owners name in the title was a third party, 
different from the name on the registration and from Mr. Bartlett (S.H.-l 1). 
Officer Rowley took the information he had and contacted dispatch for a 
"27," a Utah Drivers License Check. He also requested a warrant search. After 
two or three minutes Officer Rowley was advised Mr. Bartlett's Utah Drivers 
License was suspended and he had a warrant out of Vernal (S.H.-l 1, 12). He 
advised Mr. Bartlett he was under arrest but is unsure whether he handcuffed him 
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at that time (S.H.-12). Rowley asked the adult passengers to pull out their pockets 
so he could check for weapons (S.H.-13). Mr. Snow produced a "brass bowl" with 
marijuana residue in it (S.H.-13). He advised Mr. Snow he was under arrest as 
well(S.H.-13). 
Officer Rowley testified at that time he took both Mr. Bartlett and Mr. 
Snow back to his vehicle and advised them of their Miranda Rights by reading 
from a card taken from his wallet (S.H.-14). He believed they both indicated they 
understood their rights and agreed to talk with him (S.H.-14). Officer Rowley 
testified that at this point he asked Mr. Bartlett for a consent to search the vehicle 
and that Mr. Bartlett said it was okay (S.H.-14). However, on cross-examination 
Officer Rowley admitted that rather than ask for consent he had told Mr. Bartlett 
that he was going to search the vehicle. 
Deputy Monte Dalton with the San Juan County Sheriffs Office arrived at 
the scene to assist Officer Rowley sometime between the stop and the search of 
the vehicle (S.H.-15; 43). Although the initial stop was at 2:00 p.m. (S.H.-9) and 
Dalton arrived at 2:05 p.m. (S.H.-44), Dalton testified Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Snow 
were not arrested until 3:00 p.m. (S.H.-46). He referenced his notes to verify the 
time (S.H.-45). 
During the search Officer Rowley found a little plastic container with some 
white residue. At that time he found the container Deputy Dalton approached him 
and told him that Mr. Bartlett had told him there were some cross tops under the 
front seat (S.H.-16). Cross Tops are a legal stimulant commonly sold in truck 
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stops (S.H.-36). Rowley never found any Cross Tops (S.H.-16). The white 
residue field-tested positive for methamphetamine (S.H.-17). 
Officer Dalton testified on examination as to what statements Mr. Bartlett 
made purportedly after waiving his Miranda Rights. Mr. Bartlett told him he had 
crushed Cross Tops, that he had purchased them, and crushed them to drink in his 
coffee to stay awake (S.H.-18,19). 
On cross examination Officer Rowley conceded his testimony as to when 
Mr. Bartlett was read Miranda differed from his police report. The written report 
indicated Mr. Bartlett was arrested and read his rights prior to the passengers being 
searched (S.H.-22, 24). Officer Rowley acknowledged Mr. Bartlett did not arrive 
at the jail until possibly 3:30 p.m. (S.H.-28). 
Deputy Dalton testified as to how it came about that Mr. Bartlett made 
statements about the cross tops. After Mr. Bartlett was arrested and was being 
controlled by Deputy Dalton he "asked" what was going to be found (S.H.-49). 
Deputy Dalton continued questioning, getting Bartlett to admit the plastic 
container was his and eliciting information about a big bottle in the trunk (S.H.-
50). Mr. Bartlett also told him about mixing the cross tops in his coffee (S.H.-51). 
On cross examination Deputy Dalton confirmed from his notes that 
Miranda was given some 45-50 minutes after he arrived and that Rowley did not 
get consent to search the vehicle (S.H.-55, 56). 
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Mr. Bartlett testified that he did not give consent to search the vehicle and 
the he was never advised of his Miranda Rights. Any statements he made were 
after he was confronted and arrested (S.H.-64-5). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Bartlett's Motion to Suppress. The 
Officer exceeded the scope of the traffic violation. Although Mr. Bartlett may 
have been taken into custody the vehicle could have been released to a passenger, 
his mother, without a search. 
Any statements made by Mr. Bartlett should be suppressed either because 
he was not advised of his Miranda rights or if he did waive it was in the course of 
an illegal seizure and his consent is void. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: The Officer unlawfully exceeded the scope of the stop. 
The burden is on the State of Utah to justify the stop and subsequent search. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the "Right of 
the people to be secure in there persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures." The Utah Supreme Court has held that while 
a person had a lesser expectation of privacy in his or her vehicle, one does not lose 
the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an automobile. State v. Lopez, 
873 P. 2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994). The State is prohibited from conducting 
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unreasonable searched and seizures during a routine traffic stop. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); See also Lopez, supra. Although Bartlett does 
not take issue with the initial stop, conceding the officer's actions were reasonably 
justified he does contend that, "The resulting detention was [not] reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
place." Lopez, AT 1131-32, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 312 U.S. 1, (1968); bracketed 
material added. 
Although the traffic stop was valid, the courts have held that when an 
officer stops a vehicle, "The detention must be temporary and last no longer that is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." The test for whether a search of 
seizure is constitutionally plausible is twofold: (1) Was the officer's actions 
justified at its inception? And (2) Was the resulting detention reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place? See 
State v. Shepard, 955 P. 2d 352, 355 (Utah App 1998). 
Once a traffic stop is made, the detention "must be temporary and 
last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 103 S. 
Ct. 1319 (1983). Both the "length and [the] scope of the detention 
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P. 2d 761, 
763 (Utah 1991)(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20). This means that 
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue 
a citation. However, once the driver has produces a valid drivers 
license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be 
allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further 
delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797 
P. 2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(quoting United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F. 2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). Investigative 
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questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of the more serious criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable 
facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer 
at the time of the stop. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P. 2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1987); State v. Munsen, 821 P. 2d 13, 15 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); Robinson, 797 P. 2d at 435. If reasonable suspicion of more 
serious criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still 
limited. The officers must "diligently [pursue] a means of 
investigation that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions 
quickly, during which time it [is] necessary to detain the defendant." 
State v. Grovier, 808 P. 2d 133, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, 105 S. 
CT. 1568(1985)). 
Lopez, Supra at 1132. 
Mr. Bartlett's argument of what went unconstitutionally wrong in his case 
is exactly that -that the detention lasted longer than necessary for the purpose of 
the stop. Mr. Bartlett was stopped on a very minor traffic violation-speeding. 
While he did not have a driver's license he did produce paperwork showing 
entitlement to the vehicle. Once the office found the outstanding warrant, he was 
required to arrest the Defendant, issue a citation, or release him. State v. 
Chapman, 921 P 2d 446. 
The facts in the Shepherd case, cited above, are similar to this. In Shepherd 
the Defendants were pulled over for speeding. They could not produce a valid 
registration and there were questions about ownership while the comparing the 
vehicle identification number on a card produced by the Defendants the officer 
saw a marijuana pipe in plain view. The court found that the officer's conduct was 
supported by an objectively reasonable suspicion. Although the State may argue 
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the similarities, there are two important distinctions. 1. There was nothing in plain 
view in Bartlett's car. Contraband was not discovered until a search was 
conducted. 2. There was no need to search Bartlett's vehicle since it could have 
been released to his mother. 
The State may not argue that the search was justified by the consent of Mr. 
Bartlett. The burden of establishing that a warrantless search is lawful is on the 
State. State v. Larocco, 794 P 2d 460. To show that consent was lawfully 
obtained the State must show it was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by 
explorations of prior eligibility. 
"[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal police activity 
is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both of the following 
tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii) the 
consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior 
illegality." State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); see 
also State v. Arroyo, 796 P. 2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). "It is the 
State's burden to prove that a consent was voluntarily given... If the 
State fails to meet this burden, the evidence is deemed inadmissible 
against the defendant." Ham, 910 P. 2d at 439; accord Thurman, 
846 P. 2d at 1263; State v. Robinson, 797 P. 2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). This court has adopted the following analytical 
framework to determine whether the State has met its burden of 
proving that consent was voluntarily given: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the 
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given";(2) the government must prove consent was given without 
duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating 
these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived.' Ham, 
910 P. 2d at 439 (citations omitted)(alterations in original). In 
determining whether consent was voluntarily given we will look to 
the "totality of all circumstances." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973); accord 
Ham, P. 2d at 439. 
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State v. Hansen, 17 P. 3d 1135 (UT App. 2000) 
It appears that the better position is that the issue of consent is moot. 
Officer Rowley recanted his testimony that Mr. Bartlett gave consent, conceding 
that he had informed Mr. Bartlett he was going to search the vehicle. Deputy 
Dalton also testified the search was nonconsensual. However, even if the court 
chooses to analyze the consent issue, it must ultimately be held that any consent 
given was the result of an illegal detention and void. See State v. Arrayo, 796 P 
2d 684 (1990), and State v. Robinson, 797 P 2d 431 (Utah App 1990). 
In Robinson, the court determined, on facts similar to the present case, that 
once the purposes of the initial stop had been accomplished, further detention of 
the Defendant's was violative of their Fourth Amendment rights, Supra, at 437. 
Because they were held after a brief detention the court held their consent was not 
voluntarily and suppressed the results of the reach. In Mr. Bartlett's case evidence 
is that the detention was lengthy, not brief. 
The Fourth Amendment requires not only the exclusions of all evidence 
directly obtained through its violation but also the exclusions of all "fruits" 
thereof, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). Therefore any 
statements made by Defendants must be suppressed. 
Again, Defendant urges this argument is moot. He denies being advised of 
his Miranda rights or waiving the same. However, even viewed in the lights most 
favorable to the State, he was not advised of Miranda until 50 minutes after Dalton 
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arrived. Clearly any statements Defendants made were in a custodial 
interrogations setting after a lengthy illegal detention. They were used against him 
extensively at trial. (Trial Transcript 70, 74, 75, 95). 
They should be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The original purpose of the traffic stop was quickly resolved. Mr. Bartlett 
could have been arrested or released without further questioning or a search of his 
vehicle. Because Mr. Bartlett was unlawfully detained the search of vehicle, 
whether based on "consent" or not is invalid. Any statements he made should be 
suppressed for failure to obtain a waiver of Miranda rights or because such waiver 
was obtained through illegal exploitations. 
This court should reverse the trial courts denial of the Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 13th day of May 2003. 
L/£ *UL. 
WILLIAM L. SCHWTZ 
Attorney for Appellar 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Opening Brief of Appellant to Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, 160 E. 300 
South, Heber Wells Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this 15th 
day of May 2003. 
L/JU^ 
William L. Schultz 
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ADDENDUM 
Copy of January 7,2003, Judgment and Order of Commitment to Utah State Prison. 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
San Juan County 
<^o JAN 0 7 2003 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
DEPUTY 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JAMES EARL BARTLETT 
Defendant. 
JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0217-94 
JANUARY 6, 2003 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz 
DEFENDANT, JAMES EARL BARTLETT, having been found guilty of 
the offenses of: 
Count 1: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third 
Degree Felony; Count 2: DRIVING ON SUSPENDED OR REVOKED 
OPERATOR'S LICENSE, a Class C Misdemeanor; and Count 3: NO 
REGISTRATION, a Class C Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having 
been shown why judgment of this Court should not be pronounced, 
it is the judgment of this Court as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant is forthwith 
remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer for transportation to the Utah State Prison and 
execution to the eentanc* given herein. 
Defendant is npw sentenced to a term in the Utah State 
Prison not to exceed FIVS YEARS on Count 1, 90 DAYS in the San 
Juan County Jail on each Count 2 and 3, to be served 
concurrently-
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the %^ day of January, 2 003, I 
Trailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGEMENT AHD OOTBR OF COMMITWKNT to William L. Schultz, Attorney 
for the d«£*x*d*nt at PO Sox 93 7, Mccto, UT 04532, Adult Probation 
and Parole, 1165 South Hiqhway 191 #3, Moab, UT 84532; and to the 
Department of Corrections, p,o. Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
